We set out a modal logic for reasoning about multilevel security of probabilistic systems. This logic includes modalities for time, probability, knowledge, and permitted-knowledge. Making use of the Halpern-Tuttle framework for reasoning about knowledge and probability, we give a semantics for our logic and prove that it is sound. We give t w o syntactic de nitions of perfect multilevel security and show that their semantic interpretations are equivalent t o t w o earlier, independently motivated characterizations. We also discuss the relation between these characterizations of security and between their usefulness in security analysis.
Multilevel security is the aspect of computer security concerned with protecting information that is classi ed with respect to a multilevel hierarchy e.g., UNCLASSIFIED, SECRET, TOP SECRET. A probabilistic system is a hardware or software system that makes probabilistic choices e.g., by consulting a random number generator during its execution. Such probabilistic choices are useful in a multilevel security context for introducing noise to reduce the rate of or eliminate illicit communication between processes at di erent classi cation levels. In this paper, we are concerned with de nitions of perfect information-theoretic multilevel security in the sense that the de nitions rule out all illicit communication without relying on any complexity-theoretic assumptions. That is, our model allows the system penetrators to have unlimited computational power and yet, our de nitions are still su cient to ensure that there can be no illicit communication. 1 The systems that we address can be depicted in the form shown in Figure 1 . This general form is intended to represent systems including physical hardware with hard-wired connections to other systems, an operating system kernel with connections to other processes provided by shared memory, and processes executing on a multiprocessor with connections to other systems provided by a n i n terprocess communication IPC mechanism.
There is a system, called , that provides services to the other systems. For example, in the case of a multiuser relational database, would store and control access to a set of relations. is the system with respect to which w e will be reasoning about multilevel security.
There is a set of systems labeled S 1 , S 2 ; : : : ,S i in the gure, called the covert senders", that have access to secret information. These systems are called covert senders" because they may attempt to covertly send secret information, via , to other systems that are not authorized to see the information. It is these attempts with which w e are concerned. As is commonly done in the literature, we will often refer to the covert senders as high systems referring to the situation where the covert senders have access to highly classi ed information. We will also refer to the set of covert senders collectively as the high environment, denoted H. These systems are part of the environment" in the sense that they are in the environment of the central system, .
There is a second set of systems labeled R 1 , R 2 ; : : : ,R j in the gure, called the covert receivers", that are not authorized to see the secret information that is available to the covert senders. We will often refer to the covert receivers as low systems, or collectively as the low environment, denoted L.
If the covert senders are able to use to communicate information to the covert receivers, we will say that has a covert channel, or equivalently for our purposes that is insecure. A few notes are in order.
1. It is important to bear in mind that the threat that we are concerned with is not that the users i.e., the human users of the covert sender systems are attempting to send secret information to the covert receivers. We assume that if they wanted to, they could more easily pass notes in the park and entirely bypass . Rather, we are concerned that the covert senders are actually trojan horses i.e., they appear to be something that the user wants, but actually contain something else that is entirely undesirable to the user and that these trojan horses are attempting to send secret information to the covert receivers. This is a legitimate concern since system developers do not want to incur the cost of verifying every component of a conglomerate system with respect to multilevel security requirements. Ideally, only a small number of components in the system e.g., in our case only have security requirements, and so require veri cation; while the remaining components can be implemented b y o -the-shelf hardware and software that are unveri ed with respect to security and therefore may be trojan horses.
We assume a worst case scenario, where all of the covert senders and covert receivers are trojan horses. Indeed, we assume that all of the trojan horses are cooperating in an attempt to transmit information from the covert senders to the covert receivers.
2. It is also important to bear in mind that in our intended application, the covert senders will not be able to communicate directly to the covert receivers i.e., by b ypassing . Typically, there are hardware or software controls to prevent this. For example, nonbypassability is one of the well-known principles of a reference monitor" see Gas88 ,  which is one of the typical applications we h a v e in mind.
3. Our model contrasts sharply with much other work on security e.g., Mea92 , DDWY93 in that we consider a set of untrusted agents viz, the covert senders and receivers that are connected via a trusted agent, whereas these other works consider a set of trusted agents connected via an untrusted agent. This di erence in our model re ects the di erence in the respective applications. The work of Mea92 and DDWY93 is intended to be used to analyze a set of legitimate and trusted agents that are attempting to establish secure communication over an untrusted network. In that work, the assumption is that the penetrator is able to subvert the network i.e., the central component of the system, but not the trusted lateral agents. In contrast, our work is intended to be used to analyze a centralized server that serves a set of untrusted entities. Correspondingly, our assumption is that the penetrator may be able to subvert the untrusted lateral agents, but not the central server.
4. The fact that we h a v e partitioned the set of systems external to into two sets, high and low, may seem to indicate that we are limiting ourselves to two levels of information e.g., SECRET and UNCLASSIFIED. However, this is not the case. In a more general setting, information is classi ed users are cleared, resp. according to a nite, partially ordered set see e.g., Den76 ; that is, there is a nite set of classi cation levels clearance levels, resp. that is ordered by a re exive, transitive, and anti-symmetric relation, which w e call dominates. A given user is permitted to observe a given piece of information only if the user's clearance dominates the classi cation of the information. In the case where there are more than two levels, a separate analysis would be performed for each level, x; in each analysis, the set of levels would be partitioned into those that are dominated by x i.e., the low" partition and the set of levels that are not dominated by x i.e., the high" partition. Thus, we h a v e lost no generality b y restricting our attention to two levels.
Our problem is to develop a logic that can be used to reason about the multilevel security of a given system . In particular, we w ould like to be able to verify whether or not a given probabilistic or deterministic system has any c o v ert channels. Our approach is similar to Glasgow, MacEwen, and Panangaden's GMP90 and Bieber and Cuppens' BC92 in that our primary de nition of security is given in terms of modal logic. In particular, as in BC92 , we s a y that a system is secure with respect to the set of low processes, denoted L, if and only if for any logical formula ', the following formula is derivable from the given premises, describing e.g., the behavior of the system .
where 2 i s i n tuitively regarded as always , 2 K L ' i s i n tuitively regarded as L knows '" and R L ' i s i n tuitively regarded as L is permitted to know '." Our work extends that of GMP90 and BC92 in that our logic includes explicit means to specify and reason about the probabilistic behavior of systems. That is, in our logic, the formula ' may s a y e.g., the probability of a given high process's input is :
says that if L knows that the probability of a given high process's input is :99, then L is permitted to know that the probability of that high process's input is :99. The motivation for reasoning about the probabilistic behavior of systems has appeared in examples and discussions of many authors cf. Bro91, Gra92, MR88, McC88, McL90, WJ90 . Essentially, the motivation is that it is possible for a probabilistic system to satisfy many existing de nitions of security e.g., Sutherland's Nondeducibility Sut86 , McCullough's Restrictiveness McC90 , etc. and still contain probabilistic covert channels. Others have developed logics to reason about knowledge and probability in the areas of arti cial intelligence viz, Ruspini Rus87 and protocol analysis viz, Fagin and Halpern FH94 . Semantically, the framework of Halpern and Tuttle HT93 encompasses the other two and, in fact, we are also able to make use of their framework to give a semantics to our logic. A primary contribution of the present paper is the uni cation of the logical approach t o m ultilevel security developed by Glasgow, MacEwen, and Panangaden GMP90 and Bieber and Cuppens BC92 with the work on security of probabilistic systems done by McLean McL90 , Browne Bro89 , and the rst author Gra92 . In particular, we prove that the semantic interpretation of 1 is equivalent to Gray's Probabilistic Noninterference which is itself equivalent to Browne's Stochastic Non-Interference. We also give a v eri cation condition in our logic and prove that it is equivalent to Gray's Applied Flow Model which is closely related to McLean's Flow Model. These results are doubly advantageous. On the one hand they constitute a formalization of the just cited information-theoretic approaches to security. On the other hand, to the extent that the just cited logical works are viewed not just as formalizations but as another basic approach to security, the results in this paper amount to a demonstration of the equivalence of independently motivated characterizations of security. We consider this to be strong evidence that both characterizations have`got things right'. For a discussion of the importance of such equivalences see, e.g., McL87 .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In x2 w e set out our model of computation. In xx3 and 4, we set out the syntax and semantics of our logic, and in x5, we prove its soundness. In x6 w e state our primary de nition of security and prove that it is equivalent to Probabilistic Noninterference. In x7 w e state our veri cation condition and show that it is equivalent to the Applied Flow Model. Finally, i n x 8, we give some conclusions of this work.
System Model
In this section, we describe our system model. This is the model by which w e will in x4
give semantics to our logic. First, we describe the general system model, which is taken from Halpern and Tuttle HT93 . Then, we will tailor the model to our needs by in Halpern and Tuttle's terminology choosing the adversaries". Finally, w e impose some additional structure on the model, resulting in our application-speci c model.
General System Model
In this subsection we review the general system model of Halpern and Tuttle. A complete description of their model can be found in HT93 . We h a v e a set of agents, P 1 ; P 2 ; : : : ; P n , each with its own local state. The global state is an n-J.W. Gray, III and P.F. Syverson. Epistemology of Information Flow in the Multilevel Security of Probabilistic Systems. NRL Memo Report 5540 95-7733, May 12, 1995 tuple of the local agents' states. 3 A run of the system is a mapping of times to global states. We assume that time is discrete because we are dealing with security at the digital level of the system. We are not, for example, addressing security issues such as analog channels in hardware. Therefore, as in HT93 , we will assume that times are natural numbers. The probabilities of moving among global states are represented in the model by means of labeled computation trees. The nodes of the trees represent global states. For any given node in a tree, the children of that node represent the set of global states that could possibly come next. Each arc from a node to one of its children is labeled with the probability o f moving to that state. Thus, from any given node, the sum of the probabilites on its outgoing arcs must be one. As in HT93 , we also assume that the set of outgoing arcs is nite and that all arcs are labeled with nonzero probabilities. This nal assumption can be viewed as a convention that if the probability o f m o ving from state x to state y is zero, then state y is not included as a child of state x.
Certain events in a system may be regarded as nonprobabilistic while still being nondeterministic. The typical example occurs when a user is to choose an input and in the analysis of the system, we do not wish to assign a probability distribution to that choice; in such a case, we regard that choice as nonprobabilistic. All nonprobabilistic choices in the system are lumped into a single choice that is treated as being made by an adversary" prior to the start of execution. Thus, after this choice is made, the system's execution is purely probabilistic. In Halpern and Tuttle's words, the nonprobabilistic choices have been factored out". In the model of computation, each possible choice by the adversary corresponds to a labeled computation tree. In other words, a system is represented as a set of computation trees, each one corresponding to a di erent c hoice by the adversary. There is no indication how the adversary's choice is made, just that it is made once and for all, prior to the start of execution.
Application-Speci c System Model
In this section, we impose some additional structure on the general model described in the previous section. We x the set of agents, x our model and intuitions regarding commu-nication, place some environmental constraints on the agents, and x the set of choices available to the adversary. Figure 1 and the surrounding discussion, we can limit our model to three agents: 1 the system under consideration, denoted , 2 the covert senders or alternatively, the high environment, denoted H, and 3 the covert receivers or alternatively, the low e n vironment, denoted L. In the remainder of the paper, we will tacitly assume that the global system is comprised of these three agents.
AGENTS As indicated in
MODEL OF COMMUNICATION Our model of communication is similar to those of BC92 , Gra92 , and Mil90 . We view 's interface as a collection of channels on which inputs and outputs occur. Since we consider the agent H resp., L to consist of all processing that is done in the high resp., low environment, including any communication mechanism that delivers messages to , we will not need to model messages in transit or, in Halpern and Tuttle's terminology, the state of the environment; rather, these components of the global state will be included as part of H's and L's state.
In many systems of interest, the timing of events is of concern. See Lam73 for an early description of covert communication channels that depend on timing; see Wra92 for more recent w ork. In such cases, we model the passage of time by taking the set of times i.e., the domain of the runs to be the ticks of some clock that is independent of the covert senders' and receivers' processing. For example, we m a y think of this clock as being 's system clock. In this way, c o v ert channels that depend on time can be properly accounted for. Since the mechanisms of high-level 4 I O routines may i n troduce covert channels see, e.g.,
McC88
, x2.3 , we take a v ery low-level view of I O. In particular, we assume one input and one output per channel per unit time. That is, for each time we h a v e a v ector of inputs one for each c hannel and a vector of outputs one for each c hannel. If a given agent produces no new data value at a given time, it may in fact serve as a signal in a covert channel exploitation. Hence, we treat such no new signal" events as inputs. Similarly, w e do not consider the possibility that the system can prevent an input from occurring. Rather, the system merely chooses whether to make use of the input or ignore it. Any a c knowledgement that an input has been received is considered to be an output. Given these considerations, we x our model of communication as follows. We assume the 4 In this context, high-level" means highly abstract rather than highly classi ed. IN + : representing the set of positive natural numbers. This set will be used as our set of times".
Since there is one input per channel at each time, we will be talking about the vector of inputs that occurs at a given time. We will denote the set of all vectors of inputs by I C .
Typical inputs vectors will be denoted a; a 0 ; a 1 ; : : : 2I C .
Similarly, w e will denote the set of all output vectors by O C and typical output vectors will be denoted b; b 0 ; b 1 ; : : : 2O C . Now, to talk about the history of input vectors up to a given time, we i n troduce notation for traces. We will denote the set of input traces of length k by I C;k . Mathematically, I C;k is a shorthand for the set of functions from C f 1 ; 2 ; : : : k gto I. Therefore, for a trace 2 I C;k , w e will denote the single input on channel c 2 C at time k 0 k by c; k 0 .
We will also need to talk about in nite traces of inputs. For this we use the analogous notation I C;1 , which is short hand for the set of functions from C IN + to I Similarly, w e will denote the set of output traces of length k by O C;k and the set of in nite output traces by O C;1 . Naturally, for an output trace , c; k represents the output on channel c at time k.
There will be situations when we w ant to talk about vectors or traces of inputs or outputs on some subset of the channels, S C. In such cases we will use the natural generalizations of the above notations, viz, I S , I S;k , I S;1 , etc..
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS Any given agent will be able to see the inputs and outputs on a subset of the channels. We make this precise by restricting" vectors and traces to subsets of C. Given an input vector a 2 I C and a set of channels S C, w e de ne a S 2 I S to be the input vector on channels in S such that a Sc = a c for all c 2 S.
Similarly, given an input trace 2 I C;k and a set of channels S C, w e de ne S 2 I S;k to be the input trace for channels in S such that Sc; k 0 = c; k 0 for all c 2 S and all k 0 k.
We assume that the set of low c hannels, denoted L, is a subset of C. I n tuitively, L is the set of channels that the low e n vironment, L, is able to directly see. In particular, L is able to see both the inputs and the outputs that occur on channels in L.
In practice, there will be some type of physical or procedural constraints on the agent L to prevent it from directly viewing the inputs and outputs on channels in C , L. F or example, those channels may represent wires connected to workstations that are used for processing secret data. In this case, the secret workstations might be located inside a locked and guarded room. In addition, periodic checks of the wires might be made to ensure that there are no wiretaps on them. In this way, L is prevented from directly viewing the data that passes over the channels in C , L.
On the other hand, we place no constraints on the set of channels that H is able to see. In particular, we make the worst-case assumption that H is able to see all inputs and outputs on all channels. The above considerations are consistent with what we've called the Secure Environment Assumption" in previous work Gra92, GS92 . In the present paper, this assumption is made precise in terms of our de nition of the adversary to be given next.
THE ADVERSARY As discussed above, in Halpern and Tuttle's framework, all nonprobabilistic choices are factored out of the execution of the system by xing an adversary at the start of execution. To make use of this framework, we m ust de ne the set of possible adversaries from which this choice is made.
The adversary" in our application is the pair of agents, H and L, that are attempting to send data from the high environment across the system to the low e n vironment. To b e fully general, we model these agents as mixed strategies in the game-theoretic sense. That is, at each point in the execution of the system the strategy gives the probability distribution over the set of next possible inputs, conditioned on the history up to the current point. In the next section, we present an example to motivate the need for such generality. Before doing that, we make the adversary precise with the following two de nitions.
De nition 2.1 An adversary is a conditional probability function, Aa j ; ; k. Here a 2 I C and k is some time such that there is a time k 0 with k k 0 1 , and 2 I C;k 0 and 2 O C;k 0 . The k indicates that the probability o f a is conditional only on the restriction of and to k. Intuitively, the adversary describes the environment's conditional distribution on the next input vector, given the previous history of inputs and outputs.
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Later in this section, we describe how a given adversary A and the description of a particular system, , are used to construct the corresponding computation tree T A .
De nition 2.2 We s a y that an adversary A satis es the Secure Environment Assumption with respect to a set of channels L C i there exists a pair of conditional probability functions H and L such that for all a 2 I C , k 2 IN + , all 2 I C;k , and all 2 O C;k , Aa j ; ; k = H a C , L j ; ; k LaL j L; L; k where denotes real multiplication.
The Secure Environment Assumption can be intuitively understood as saying that the input on channels in C , L at time k is conditionally statistically independent of the input on channels in L at time k, and the input on channels in L at time k depends only on previous inputs and outputs on channels in L. For the remainder of this paper, we will assume that all adversaries from which the initial choice is made satisfy the Secure Environment Assumption. Since there is one tree for each possible adversary, w e can think of the set of trees as being indexed by the adversaries. Therefore, we will often write T A , T A 0 , T A i , etc.
It is clear that for an adversary A that satis es the Secure Environment Assumption wrt L, the conditional probability functions H and L that must exist are, in fact, unique. Further, given H and L, there is a unique adversary, A, for which H and L are the probability functions that satisfy the corresponding constraint. We will therefore sometimes write T H;L , T H 0 ;L 0 , etc. when we w ant to refer to the parts of the adversary individually. Note that our de nition of an adversary is not meant to be as general as the adversary discussed by Halpern and Tuttle. In fact, Halpern and Tuttle give no structure at all to their adversary. Rather, our adversary is application-speci c; in particular, it is for J.W. Gray, III and P.F. Syverson. Epistemology of Information Flow in the Multilevel Security of Probabilistic Systems. NRL Memo Report 5540 95-7733, May 12, 1995 reasoning about multilevel security of probabilistic systems and is not designed to be used outside that domain. On the other hand, this particular adversary represents a novel application of Halpern and Tuttle's framework. In their examples, the adversary represents one or both of two possible things:
the initial input to the system; and the schedule according to which certain events e.g., processors taking steps occur.
In contrast, our adversary does not represent a given input to the system. Rather, it represents a mixed strategy for choosing the inputs to the system. In some sense, we can think of this as a generalization on the rst item above; however, our application still ts within the framework set out by Halpern and Tuttle.
THE STATE OF THE SYSTEM At a n y given point, P , i n a n y given computation tree, J.W. Gray, III and P.F. Syverson. Epistemology of Information Flow in the Multilevel Security of Probabilistic Systems. NRL Memo Report 5540 95-7733, May 12, 1995 COMPUTATION TREES Now that we h a v e set out the possible states of the system i.e., the points of computations, we can talk about the construction of the computation trees.
For each reachable point, P , w e assume that 's probability distribution on outputs is given.
For example, this can be given by a conditional probability distribution, Ob; c j ; ; ;k, where c is the vector representing values of all internal state variables i.e., the internal system state at time k + 1 , b 2 O C is the vector of outputs produced by the system at k + 1, and ; ; give the history through k of inputs, outputs, and internal state values, respectively.
Given Ob;c j ; ; ;k and the adversary, A we can construct the corresponding computation tree by starting with the initial state of the system i.e., the point at the root of the tree with empty histories of inputs, outputs, etc. and iteratively extending points as follows. Let P be a point in the tree with internal system history , input history , and output history . W e will make P 0 a c hild of P i
1. P 0 is formed from P by modifying the internal system state to c and extending P 's input history output history, resp. with a b, resp.; and 2. both Ob;c j ; ; ;k and Aa j ; ; k are positive.
In such cases, we label the arc from P to P 0 with Ob; c j ; ; ;k A a j ; ; k, i.e., the system, , and the environment, A, make their choices independently. RUNS OF THE SYSTEM A run of the system is an in nite sequence of states along a path in one of the computation trees. When we w ant to talk about the particular run, , and time, k, at which a p o i n t P occurs, we will denote the point b y the pair ; k. Further, if we wish to talk about the various components of the run, i.e., the trace of the inputs, , outputs, , or other variables, , w e will denote the run by ; ; and denote the point, P , b y ; ; ;k. For a given tree, T , w e denote the set of runs i.e., in nite sequences of states, formed by tracing a path from the root, by runsT . For security applications we are concerned with information ow i n to and out of the system rather than with information in the system per se. Thus, though our system model is adequate to represent i n ternal states and traces thereof, in subsequent sections it will be adequate to represent systems entirely in terms of input and output. For example, system behavior at time k can be represented bỳ O b j ; ; k' rather than`Ob; c j ; ; ;k'.
Syntax
In this section we set out our formal language and use it to describe two simple systems. Then we give the axioms and rules of our logic.
Formation Rules
To describe the operation of the system under consideration viz, , we u s e a v ariant o f Lamport's Raw T emporal Logic of Actions RTLA Lam91 . 5 The primary di erence is that we add a modal operator Pr i ' that allows us to specify and reason about the probabilistic behavior of the system. From the previous section, we assume the following basic sets of symbols, all nonempty: C, I, O, and IR. Members of IR will have the usual representation|e.g., 43:5 2 IR .
We will also be talking about the subjects or agents of the system. Formally, a subject, S C, is identi ed with the process's view of the system, i.e. the set of channels on which it can see the inputs and outputs. Formulae in the language are built up according to the following rules.
constants from the set of basic symbols are terms.
state variables representing the value of that variable in the current state are terms. Among the state variables, there are two reserved for each communication channel.
For each c 2 C, w e h a v e a state variable c in that takes values from I, and another state variable c out that takes values from O. Note that, implicitly, inputs are from the covert senders and receivers into the system and outputs are from the system to the covert senders and receivers. This is because is the system under consideration i.e., with respect to which w e are reasoning about security. We h a v e no mechanism and no need to specify communication between agents not including the system under consideration.
primed state variables e.g., c 0 in are terms. These represent the value of the variable in the next state.
We use standard operators among terms e.g., + and for addition and multiplication, respectively, with parentheses for grouping subterms, to form composite terms.
an atomic predicate is an equation or inequality among terms not containing primed state variables.
an atomic action is an equation or inequality among terms possibly including primed as well as unprimed state variables. Note that all predicates are actions.
for any action, ', and for any subject S C, Pr S ' is a real-valued term representing the subjective probability that S assigns to the formula '. For any predicate, ', ' is a temporal formula.
For any action or temporal formula ', 2' is a temporal formula to be read intuitively as always '. We build up composite predicates, actions, and temporal formulae, resp., in the usual recursive fashion using^, _, :, and !. Now, to specify and reason about our security properties of interest, we add three nite sets of modal operators on formulae: k 1 ; : : : ; k n ,K 1 ; : : : ; K n , and R 1 ; : : : ; R n , representing knowledge of a relatively weak adversary, knowledge of a powerful adversary, and permitted-knowledge respectively for each subject represented by the subscript of the operator. Therefore, we add the following additional formation rules to our syntax.
For any action temporal formula, resp. ', and for any subject S C, k S ' representing that the weak adversary S knows ', K S ' representing that the powerful adversary S knows ' and R S ' representing that S has permitted knowledge of ' are actions temporal formulae, resp.. Later in the paper, we will make the meaning of these three operators precise. For now, we merely mention that the weak-adversary knowledge operators k S will be given the standard semantics e.g., as in HT93 ; the powerful-adversary knowledge operators K S will be given semantics that imply greater knowledge on the part of the subject viz, knowledge of the probability of certain future events.
Examples
We n o w give t w o simple examples of how to describe systems in our language. Ultimately, we will have su cient formal machinery to show that one of these systems is secure and the other is not; however, here we simply set them out formally. These descriptions are meant to give the reader an intuitive feel for the meaning of expressions in the language. Precise meanings will be given in x4. Also, the second of these examples will motivate our choice of modeling adversaries as strategies.
Example 3.1 The rst example is a simple encryption box that uses a one-time pad" Den82 . It has two c hannels, high and low. A t each tick of the system clock, it inputs a 0 or 1 on the high channel and outputs a 0 or 1 on the low c hannel. The low output is computed by taking the exclusive or" denoted of the high input and a randomly generated bit. It is well known that this results in an output stream that is uniformly distributed. Therefore, we can describe this system as follows.
Let C = fh;lg, I = f0;1g, and O = f0;1g. Then, the system is speci ed by the following formula.
2 Prl 0 out = 0 = Prl 0 out = 1 = 0 : 5 In this formula, l out is a state variable representing the output on the low c hannel, l. Therefore, l 0 out is the output on l at the next time. Further, Prl 0 out = 0 denotes the probability that the output on l is a 0 at the next time. Hence, the entire formula says that at all times, the probability of producing a one 1 on the next clock tick is equal to the probability of producing a zero 0, which is equal to 0:5. Note that we h a v e not speci ed inputs per se since these constitute environment behavior rather than system behavior. NRL Memo Report 5540 95-7733, May 12, 1995 Example 3.2 The second example is an insecure version of the simple encryption box. This system was rst described by Shannon in Sha58 . As in the rst example, at each tick computes the exclusive or" of the current high input and a randomly generated bit and outputs that value on the low c hannel. However, in this system, the randomly generated bit used at any given tick is actually generated and output on the high output channel during the previous tick of the clock.
This can be expressed in our formalism as follows. Let C = fh; lg, I = f0;1g, and O = f0; 1g.
The following formula speci es the system. 2Prh 0 out = 0 = Prh 0 out = 1 = 0 : 5 l 0 out = h out h 0 in Note that in the second conjunct, h out is unprimed, indicating that the output on l at the next time is the exclusive or" of the current output on h with the next input on h. Now note that if the high agent ignores its output, then this system acts exactly as the system from the previous example and can be used for perfect encryption. In particular, suppose we w ere to model an adversary as an input string|the input to be provided by the high agent. Then, it is easy to prove that for any adversary i.e., any high input string xed prior to the start of execution, the output to low will be uniformly distributed and, in fact, will contain no information about the high input string. However, the bit that will be used as the one-time pad at time t is available to the high agent at time t,1. Therefore, due to the algebraic properties of exclusive or", viz, xxy = y the high agent can use this information to counteract the encryption. In particular, the high agent can employ a game-theoretic strategy to send any information it desires across the system to the low agent. For example, suppose the high agent wishes to send a sequence of bits, b 1 ; b 2 ; : : : .W e'll denote the high input resp., output at time k by h in k resp., h out k. The appropriate strategy for the high agent is as follows.
The high agent c hooses its input for time k + 1 a s h in k + 1 = h out k b k .
Thus, the output to low at time k + 1, denoted l out k + 1 is computed as follows. Thus, by employing the correct strategy, the high agent can noiselessly transmit an arbitrary message over to the low agent. This, of course, motivates our choice of strategies as the adversary, rather than, e.g., input strings.
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We n o w h a v e some sense of the formal language, with the exception of the modal operators k S , K S , and R S . As previously mentioned, these operators will be used to formalize the security property that interests us; so, we will illustrate their use in a later section. First, we will describe the logical axioms and inference rules that are used to prove properties about systems.
The Logic
We n o w give the axioms of our logic. In the following, we will use`'' and`' to refer to formulae of our language.
Propositional Reasoning All instances of tautologies of propostional logic.
Temporal Reasoning The following are standard axioms for temporal reasoning about discrete systems. The logic they constitute is generally called S4.3Dum or sometimes D.
See Gol92 for details. Note also that these are the formulae Abadi uses to axiomatize Lamport's TLA Aba90 . We h a v e labelled the axioms with their historical names. Let ' and be formulae of our language. Epistemic Reasoning The nonredundant axioms of the Lewis system S5. cf. Che80 or Gol92 apply to the strong knowledge operators K i , the weak knowledge operators k i , and the permitted-knowledge operators R i . We state them only for the strong knowledge operators. As for temporal axioms, we give the axioms their historical names. Let S be a subject, and let ' and be formulae of our language.
K K S '^K S ' ! ! K S Knowledge respects modus ponens. T K S ' ! ' What one knows is true. 5 :K S ' ! K S :K S ' If you don't know something, then you know that you don't know it.
We also have t w o axioms for relating weak knowledge to permitted knowledge and permitted knowledge to strong knowledge.
Random Variable Axioms The standard requirements for random variables in the probability theoretic sense.
PM Positive Measure for any formula, ', and any subject, S, Pr S ' 0 The probability o f a n y e v ent is greater than or equal to zero. Intuitively, KO say that a subject knows the distribution on its own outputs conditioned on the previous history of inputs and outputs that it has seen. Similarly, a subject knows the distribution on its own inputs conditioned on the previous history of inputs and outputs it has seen. However, we need no corresponding axiom KI since it follows trivially from RI and RK. F rom theorems KI and KO we can inductively show that every subject knows the probability o f a n y e v ent that it can see in nite time. RI says that a subject is permitted to know the conditional distribution on its own inputs. But, a subject is permitted to know the conditional distribution on its own outputs only if the system is secure|e.g., for a l o w subject, only if knowing that distribution does not reveal any information about the distribution on high inputs. The absence of an axiom RO, corresponding to KO, is what syntactically captures this. The above are all of our axioms. We n o w give the rules of our logic, which are all standard.
MP Modus Ponens From ' and ' ! infer . Nec Necessitation This rule applies to all of the modal operators we h a v e i n troduced: 2, K S , k S , and R S . It is called`necessitation' because it was originally applied to a necessity operator. We set it out for 2 only. F rom`' infer`2'
Note that in the above,``'' indicates a derivation of ' from the axioms alone, rather than from a set of premises. Derivations will be formally de ned below. Thus, in the case of knowledge strong or weak for example, Nec says that if ' is a theorem derivable without any premises then all subjects know '. We n o w h a v e su cient machinery to give a c haracterization of a formal derivation. We write`,`'' to indicate a derivation of ' from ,, and we write``'' to indicate a derivation of ' from the axioms alone.
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This completes our statement of the formal system.
Semantics
In the last section we presented a syntactic system. So far we h a v e only intuitive meanings to attach to this formalism. In this section we provide semantics for our system in terms of the Halpern-Tuttle framework and our application-speci c model set out in x2. C, I, and O are the sets of channels, possible inputs, and possible outputs, respectively; v is the assignment function, which assigns semantic values to syntactic expressions at each world; values of v at a particular world P , will be indicated by the projection`v P '; the powerful i S and weak i S are knowledge accessibility relations, one each for each subject S; and the i S are permitted-knowledge accessibility relations, also one for each subject. In the J.W. Gray, III and P.F 1995 remainder of this paper we will generally denote the accessibility relations corresponding to subject S bỳ p owerful S ',` weak S ', and S '. These will each be further explained when we come to the assignment function. In assigning meaning to our language, it is of fundamental importance to associate a probability space with each labeled computation tree. In particular, for each labeled computation tree T A we will construct a sample space of runs, R A , a n e v ent space, X A i.e., those subsets of R A to which a probability can be assigned and a probability measure A that assigns probabilities to members of X A .
Semantic Model
Our construction of this probability space is quite natural and standard see, e.g., Sei92 as well as HT93 for two instances. We will not go into detail explaining the basic concepts of probability and measure theory here cf. Hal50 or Shi84 .
De nition 4.1 For a labeled computation tree T A , the associated sample space R A is the set of all in nite paths starting from the root of T A .
The set e R A , is called a generator i it consists of the set of all traces with some common nite pre x. The generators are the probability-theoretic events corresponding to nite traces. We can now de ne the event space, X A , to be the unique eld of sets generated by the set of all generators i.e., X A is the smallest subset of PR A that contains all of the generators and is closed under countable union and complementation. Suppose e is a generator corresponding to the nite pre x given by ; k. Then, the probability measure, A , is de ned for e as the product of the transition probabilities from the root of the tree, along the path , up to time k. F urther, there is a unique extension of A to the entire event space Hal50 . 
Assignment F unction
For a given point, P , w e will assign truth values to temporal formulae ' at this point. In addition, we assign values to variables, for example the input on a channel, at this point. The assignment function that does both of these is denoted by v P . To de ne v P , w e will need to assign truth values to action and temporal formulae. Therefore we will also de ne functions v P 1 ;P 2 where P 1 and P 2 are points and v where is a run to assign truth values to action formulae over a pair of points and temporal formulae on a run, respectively.
We de ne v P , v P 1 ;P 2 , and v mutually recursively below. First we present some additional notation. Since nodes are unique even across trees, for a given node P , there is no ambiguity in referring to the tree that contains P ". In the following, we will use treeP to denote that tree. We use the notation succP to denote the set of nodes that succeed P in treeP . We use the notation extensionsP to denote the set of in nite sequences of states starting at P in treeP . As discussed in HT93 , to each subject, S, and point, P , w e need to associate a sample space, S S;P . Each such sample space will be a set of points from treeP . Intuitively, these are the points within the tree that contains the current execution that the subject S considers possible. We will set out these sample spaces below. For the time being, we simply make use of the notation S S;P to refer to them.
We will be rather abusive in the use of our probability measures A . In particular, when we have a nite set of points, x, w e will write A x to denote the probability as assigned by A of passing through one of the points in x. T echnically, this is wrong, since A is de ned for certain sets of runs; not for sets of points. However, the mapping between the two is extremely natural; the set of runs correspondings to a point is the set of runs that pass through that point. Further, by the construction of our probability spaces, all sets of runs corresponding to nite sets of points are measureable. Therefore, there is no danger in this abuse of notation and it greatly simpli es our presentation. As is standard see, e.g., HT93 , we will be using accessibility relations|one for each subject|on points to give semantics to our three knowledge operators. We de ne these relations below. For the time being, we simply make use of the notation powerful S to refer to the powerful-adversary knowledge accessibility relation, weak S to refer to the weak-adversary knowledge accessibility relation, and S to refer to the permitted-knowledge accessibility relation. We n o w de ne v P , v P 1 ;P 2 , and v . Let P be a point at time k in the execution = ; ; in computation tree T A .
Numbers are assigned to number names.
Members of I and O are assigned to their syntactic identi ers. Since we h a v e not needed to include quanti cation in our language we are free to usè 8' and`9' as metalinguistic shorthand.
To i n terpret the probability of an action ' at a point P , w e will take the set of all pairs of points, P 1 ; P 2 emanating from points in S S;P . Restricting to this set, we compute the probability of those pairs such that v P 1 ;P 2 ' e v aluates to true. More precisely, for any action formula, ', and for any subject S C, To complete our semantics for probability formulas, we need to choose the sample spaces S S;P for each subject at each point. Our approach is quite straightforward. We will choose S S;P to be the set of points within treeP that have the same history of inputs and outputs on channels S as occur on the path to point P . More precisely, w e h a v e the following de nitions.
De nition 4.2 Let S 2 C be a subject and let 1 = 1 ; 1 ; 1 and 2 = 2 ; 2 ; 2 b e t w o runs not necessarily in the same tree. We s a y that De nition 4.3 Let S 2 C be a subject and let P 1 = 1 ; k 1 and P 2 = 2 ; k 2 b e t w o points not necessarily in the same tree. We s a y that P 1 and P 2 have the same S-history if and only if the following two conditions hold. De nition 4.4 Let S 2 C be a subject and P b e a p o i n t; the sample space for S at point P is given by S S;P 4 = f P 0 j treeP 0 = treeP ^P 0 and P have the same S-history g 2
In a more general setting, we w ould also want to consider the possibility that a subject S has internal state variables and could use these to make ner distinctions between points.
However, in our application, all of the internal processing of the relevant subjects viz, H and L is encoded in the adversary and is thus factored out of the computation tree. We therefore do not lose any needed generality in making the above de nition. Now, to complete our description of the assignment function we need only describe the relations powerful S , weak S , and S for all S C.
De nition 4.5 Our de nition of weak S and hence our de nition of weak-adversary knowledge is the standard de nition of knowledge in a distributed system. In particular, for any two points, P 1 and P 2 not necessarily in distinct trees and any subject, S C, W e s a y that P 2 is weak-adversary-accessible from P 1 , denoted` weak S P 1 ; P 2 ' if and only if P 1 and P 2 have the same S-history.
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Our de nition of powerful S and hence, our de nition of powerful-adversary knowledge is novel. In the analysis of distributed protocols and in other areas of computer science, it is typical to use the above w eak-adversary knowledge accesibility relation or something roughly equivalent. Our de nition of accessibility for powerful-adversary knowledge will require more|in other words, using this de nition subjects know more. In particular, subjects know" the probability distribution over the future inputs and outputs on the channels that they can see. That is, if the probability of a given future output on a low c hannel is x, then assuming a powerful adversary the low e n vironment knows that. To make this notion precise, we need some de nitions.
De nition 4.6 Let S C be a subject and let e be a set of runs, f i g, not necessarily taken from any one computation tree. We s a y that e is an S-event if and only if there exists a time k 2 IN + such that for any t w o runs, 1 and 2 , h a ving the same S-history up to time k, 1 2 e i 2 2 e.
For an S-event, e, w e will refer to the least k such that above condition holds as the length of e.
Intuitively, a n e v ent e is an S-event if and only if there is some nite time k i.e., its length after which S can always determine whether or not e has occurred. Note that in general, an S-event contains runs from more than one computation tree. Therefore, such events" will not be measurable in any of our probability spaces. Rather, we think of them as meta events and we will be interested in the measure of the subset of the runs that are contained in a given computation tree. To make this precise, we i n troduce the following de nition.
De nition 4.7 Given a computation tree, T A , and an S-event, e, the projection of e onto Observation 4.8 Every projection of every S-event is measurable. That is, for any S-event, e, and any computation tree, T A , e A 2 X A This is due to the restriction on S-events that they be observable within some nite time. In particular, the projection of an S-event o n to a tree, T , m ust also be observable within a nite time and so, it must be formable from a nite number of unions and complementations of the generators of T .
Now w e are ready to give the de nition of the knowledge accessibility relation.
De nition 4.9 Let P 1 and P 2 be two points in not necessarily distinct trees T A 1 and T A 2 , respectively and let S C be a subject. We s a y that P 2 is powerful-adversary-accessible from P 1 , denoted` powerful S P 1 ; P 2 ' if and only if 1. P 1 and P 2 have the same S-history; and 2. for any S-event e, A 1 ejS S;P 1 = A 2 e jS S;P 2 J.W. Gray, III and P.F. Syverson. Epistemology of Information Flow in the Multilevel Security of Probabilistic Systems. NRL Memo Report 5540 95-7733, May 12, 1995 2 Thus, when two points are powerful S -accessible, this implies not only that the two points have the same S-history, but also, conditioned on the current S-history, the probability distribution on all S-events, including future events, is the same. As mentioned previously, using this de nition, subjects know more" than when using the standard de nition. However, we view this as another case where we've adopted the worst-case scenario; that is, we've given the penetrators, H and L, the greatest conceivable knowledge at any given point i n the execution of the system. We will see later in the paper that this choice corresponds to some existing information-theoretic de nitions of perfect multilevel security. Our de nition of permitted knowledge is also novel. From our viewpoint, a subject's permitted knowledge does not change over the course of the system's execution. That is, a given subject's permitted knowledge is set prior to the start of execution. It is only a subject's knowledge that changes during the system's execution. Thus, we can capture a subject's permitted knowledge by de ning an accessibility relation on computation trees. We will say that two points are accessible if and only if they have the same S-history and their two containing trees are accessible; roughly speaking, two computation trees, T A 1 and T A 2 , will be accessible if and only if the parts of the adversaries, A 1 and A 2 , that correspond to S act the same" in both trees. We make this precise as follows.
De nition 4.10 Let S be a subject and T A 1 and T A 2 be two computation trees. We s a y that T A 2 is S -accessible from T A 1 , denoted` S T A 1 ; T A 2 ' if and only if for any point P 1 in T A 1 there is a point P 2 in T A 2 such that 1. P 1 and P 2 have the same S-history; and 2. for any c hannel c 2 S and any input i 2 I, v P 1 Pr S c 0
De nition 4.11 Let S be a subject and P 1 and P 2 be two points. We s a y that P 2 is S -accessible from P 1 , denoted` S P 1 ; P 2 ' if and only if 2 Thus, the S relation re ects the fact that subjects are permitted to know the conditional probability distribution on their inputs: two points are S -accessible i.e., as far as S is permitted to know they are the same point if and only if the conditional distribution on inputs visible to S is the same at both points.
There is a close relationship between our de nition of permitted knowledge and the Secure Intuitively, this relationship can be understood as follows. A subset, L, of the interface of has been partitioned o . By our de nition of permitted knowledge, we will say that the low environment, L, is permitted to know h o w the inputs on L are chosen, but not how other high inputs are chosen. By the Secure Environment Assumption, we are saying that L cannot get any information about how high inputs are chosen via any means outside of . With these two de nitions in place, we h a v e e ectively isolated the question that interests us, Can the low e n vironment L come to know, via the system of interest , something about the activity of the high environment H ?"
In the remainder of the paper, for a point P , formula ', and set of formulae ,, we will usè P j = '' to indicate that ' is true at P , and P j = , to indicate that all members of , are true at P . Finally, w e will use`, j = '' to indicate that ' is true at all worlds at which all members of , are true.
Soundness
In x6 and x7 below w e give a syntactic characterization of security and show that the semantic interpretation of our syntactic characterization of security is equivalent to certain previously developed characterizations. However, the signi cance of these results is greatly reduced unless the logic is sound. For, without soundness there is no guarantee that any formal proof of security w e might give for a system implies any independently motivated notion of security. A soundness theorem gives us just such a correspondence.
Theorem 5.1 Soundness Given a set of formulae of our language , and a formula ', If ,`'; then , j = ':
Proof: In order to prove soundness we m ust show that the axioms are valid and the rules are truth preserving except Nec which need only be theorem preserving. For most of the axioms and all of the rules the results are completely standard. Cf. Che80 and Gol92 . Hence, we do not set them out here. We speci cally assumed a semantics in which all the rules and axioms concerning logical connectives preserve soundness. Since we assume the real numbers are part of our models, the axioms concerning them must all be valid. Likewise, because the Pr' terms are interpreted as conditional probabilities of events, the RV axioms are valid in our semantics since they re ect basic facts about probability measures. The accessibility relations, set out above i n x 4, are clearly equivalence relations. Thus, by a standard result of modal logic, the S5 axioms are all valid and Nec for the knowledge operators is theorem preserving cf. Che80 . The temporal reasoning axioms are similarly valid and Nec for the temporal operator is theorem preserving based on the time structure of our model of computation cf. Gol92 . Validity o f kR is immediate and that of RK is direct from the de nition of an S-event. Therefore, the only axioms that need be checked are the I O axioms. Let S C be a subject, c 2 S a c hannel, i 2 I an input, o 2 O an output, and r 2 IR be a real number. RI Pr S c 0 in = i = r ! R S Pr S c 0 in = i = r Given a world P 1 , suppose that v P 1 Pr S c 0 in = i = r. Let P 2 b e a w orld such that S P 1 ; P 2 . Then P 1 and P 2 have the same S-history and S treeP 1 ; treeP 2 . Thus, there exists a point P 0 2 2 treeP 2 such that P 1 and P 0 2 have the same S-history, and v P 0 2 Pr S c 0 in = i = v P 1 Pr S c 0 in = i = r. But, the de nition of v P Pr S ' guarantees that if there is such P 0 2 then for any P 2 treeP 2 that has the same Shistory as P 1 , v P Pr S c 0 in = i = r, in particular v P 2 Pr S c 0 in = i = r. So, by the truth conditions for R S , v P 1 R S Pr S c 0 in = i = r = true . So, by truth conditions for the conditional, RI is true at every world P , hence valid. 
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This completes our discussion of the logic itself. In the remainder of the paper we focus on security and applications of the logic thereto.
Formal De nition of Security
In this section, we give a de nition of security|which w e call the Syntactic Security Condition SSC|using the powerful-adversary-knowledge and permitted-knowledge operators of our logic. This de nition is based on the de nition of Causality" given by Bieber and Cuppens BC92 , which w as based on the work of Glasgow, MacEwen, and Panangaden GMP90 . Although the statement of SSC is almost syntactically identical to Bieber and Cuppens' de nition of Causality, due to the di erences in the semantics of the respective logics, the meanings of i.e., the semantic interpretations of SSC and Causality are di erent. In fact, it is straightforward to show that for deterministic systems, the meaning of SSC is equivalent to the meaning of Causality. T h us, since SSC additionally applies to probabilistic systems, SSC can be viewed as a generalization of Causality. In the second subsection, we show that the meaning of SSC is equivalent to the de nition of Probabilistic Noninterference given in Gra92 .
The Syntactic Security Condition
For a given subject L, the syntactic security condition intuitively says that at all times and for any fact ' i.e., ' is a formula in our logic, if L knows ', then L is permitted to know '. As mentioned above, this intuitive explication of security w as rst suggested by Glasgow, J.W. Gray, III and P.F 1995 MacEwen, and Panangaden GMP90 and further re ned by Bieber and Cuppens BC92 . We state SSC in our formalism as follows.
De nition 6.1 Let L C be a subject. Suppose a system is described by a set of formulae in our logic, ,. We s a y that , satis es the Syntactic Security Condition SSC with respect to L if and only if for any formula ', ,`2K L ' ! R L ' 2 It is illuminating to consider for what kinds of formulae, ', the sentence K L ' is derivable but the formula R L ' is not i.e., what kind of formulae distinguish secure systems from insecure ones. There are two w a ys in which this might occur. First, we m a y be able to derive the formula K L ' from the set of premises , and the standard S5 axioms for the K L operator but not be able to derive R L ' from , and the standard S5 axioms for R L . Since the S5 axioms are the same for K L and for R L , this would mean that the premises fairly directly imply that L knows ' but L is not permitted to know '. H o w ever, in what we e n vision as the typical application of our logic, the set of premises, ,, consists of a set of formulae saying that subjects always know that the system description always holds|wherè know' refers to weak-adversary knowledge. Given the axioms of our logic, from , we can also derive the set of formulae actually describing the system and the various other relevant temporal and epistemic formulae concerning the system description itself. Therefore, the formula K L ' will be derivable from , and the standard S5 axioms only in the case that R L ' is derivable from , and the standard S5 axioms. Hence, we do not expect that the premises and the standard S5 axioms alone will determine whether or not a system is secure. The second way in which the formula K L ' m a y be derived but not the formula R L ' i s b y using axiom KO in conjunction with the other axioms, rules, and premises. Intuitively, axiom KO says that subjects always know the conditional distribution on the outputs that they can see. Recall that there is no corresponding axiom RO. T h us, subjects always know the conditional distribution on the outputs that they can see, but it is not necessarily the case that they are permitted to know that distribution. This is the essential di erence between the two operators. And further, understanding this di erence illuminates the nature of proving SSC; that is, proving SSC with respect to some subject L requires a proof that L is permitted to know the conditional distribution on outputs to L. This would typically involve showing that this conditional distribution is logically derivable from other facts that L is permitted to know. In the typical application, these other facts" would be the conditional distribution on inputs from L and the system description. Therefore, in the typical application, a system satis es SSC with respect to some subject L only if the conditional distribution on outputs to L is logically derivable from the conditional distribution on inputs from L and the system description. As will be seen in x7, this point is important for practical veri cation purposes.
Relationship to Probabilistic Noninterference
In this subsection, we recall the de nition of Probabilistic Noninterference PNI and prove that the semantic interpretation of SSC is equivalent to PNI. First, let's state the semantic interpretation of SSC.
De nition 6.2 Let L C be a subject. Suppose a system is described by a set of formulae in our logic, ,. We s a y that , satis es the Semantic Interpretation of the SSC with respect to L if and only if for any formula ' De nition 6.5 Let be a system with computation trees T . We s a y that satis es Probabilistic Noninterference PNI with respect to a subject L C i for any t w o trees satisfying the Secure Environment Assumption, T A ; T A 0 2 T and any L-event, e, i f A and A 0 agree on L behavior, then A e = A 0 e 2 PNI is equivalent to Browne's independently developed Stochastic Non-Interference Bro89 . The signi cance of PNI is that it is arguably a necessary and su cient condition for a system to be free of covert channels cf. Bro91 .
Before we prove the main result of this section, we state and prove a lemma. Let e be an L-event such that there exists a time, k, the length of e and a characteristic run, , such that for any run, 0 , 0 2 e i 0 has the same L-history as up to time k. That is, e corresponds to the nite L-history characterized by up to time k. We n o w prove the lemma for this subclass of L-events by induction on the length of e.
Base case: The length of e is zero.
Since all runs have the same L-history up to time 0, the only two L-events of length 0 are the empty set, ;, and the set of all runs from all trees, R. In the former case, NRL Memo Report 5540 95-7733, May 12, 1995 Thus, the base case is proved. Thus, in both cases A e = A 0 e and the induction case is proved. Now, we can complete the proof by observing that every L-event can be constructed by taking a nite number of unions and complementations of L-events that correspond to nite L-histories. That is, the L-events that correspond to nite L-histories are analogous to the generators of our event spaces. Thus, the desired result that for an arbitrary L-event, e, A e = A 0 e follows from the fact that the measures are equal on all of the L-events, fe i g, that are used to construct e in this fashion.
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We can now prove the following theorem relating PNI and SSC.
Theorem 6.7 Let , be a set of formulae describing and let L C be a subject. Then, satis es PNI with respect to L i , satis es the semantic interpretation of SSC with respect to L.
Proof: First we show the forward direction. Suppose satis es PNI and let P 1 be a point such that P 1 j = , . W e m ust show that for any formula ',
Applying the semantic assignment function, v P 1 , t o F ormula 11, we get For any point, P 2 , reachable from P 1 , if for any point P 3 ; p owerful L P 2 ; P 3 implies v P 3 ' = true then for any point P 3 ; L P 2 ; P 3 implies v P 3 ' = true 12 Let P 2 be a point reachable from P 1 and assume that for any point P 3 , powerful L P 2 ; P 3 implies v P 3 ' = true 13 Now, let P 3 be an arbitrary point. To prove F ormula 11, it is su cient to show that L P 2 ; P 3 implies v P 3 ' = true 14 If powerful L P 2 ; P 3 , then by F ormula 13, v P 3 ' = true and so Formula 14 holds. Therefore, assume that not powerful L P 2 ; P 3 ; that is, assume that either 1. P 2 and P 3 do not have the same L-history; or 2. for some L-event e, AP 2 ejS L;P 2 6 = AP 3 ejS L;P 3 where AP 2 is the adversary corresponding to the tree containing P 2 and AP 3 is the adversary corresponding to the tree containing P 3 .
Assuming that P 2 and P 3 do not have the same L-history i.e., item 1 above, by the de nition of L we h a v e not L P 2 ; P 3 and so Formula 14 is true. Therefore, assume that P 2 and P 3 do have the same L-history, but that item 2 holds. Let e be an L-event for which item 2 holds. We h a v e t w o cases. By axiom KO, and the soundness of our logic, v P K L ' = true . But, we h a v e that L P;P 2 and v P 2 ' = false . Therefore, v P R L ' = false , and hence v P K L ' ! R L ' = false . Since , speci es and T A is a computation tree for , P j = , and the theorem is proved.
The signi cance of this theorem is that given soundness verifying that a system satis es SSC is su cient to show that it satis es PNI, which as was previously mentioned is a necessary and su cient condition for a system to be free of covert channels. In the next section, we discuss the issue of verifying SSC.
Veri cation
Thus far in the paper, we h a v e given a logic that can be used to specify a computer system and verify that it sati es PNI. This process consists of two steps: 1 specify the system under consideration as a set of premises ,. 2 prove that ,`K L ' ! R L ' for every formula ' . 6 Since we do not quantify over formulae, it is impossible to formally deduce that for every formula ', , K L ' ! R L ' as this would require an in nite number of deductions. 7
Perhaps this shows that the veri cation e ort is not pointed in the right direction. After all, many of formulae of the language, e.g., 2 + 2 = 4, will have nothing to do with the security of a given system.
It thus seems desirable to nd a veri cation condition that 1 is entirely expressible within our logic i.e., it does not require metalinguistic variables such a s ' , and 2 does not require the veri ers to prove things that have nothing to do with security. In the following two subsections, we give such a condition and discuss its relationship to previous work.
Syntactic Statement
In McL90 , McLean de nes the Flow Model FM with the motivation of providing an abstract, but precise, explication of information ow security. McLean's intent for FM is to provide a characterization of security against which more concrete security models can be evaluated. In Gra92 , the rst author studies a more concrete version of FM, called the Applied Flow Model AFM, and it is shown therein that AFM captures a strictly stronger notion of security than PNI.
In this paper, we h a v e another reason for studying AFM: it is more easily veri ed than SSC. It was already discussed above that proving SSC requires a proof that for any ', the formula K L ' ! R L ' can be derived from the set of premises, ,. The usual technique for such a proof is to proceed by induction on the structure of '. F or example, one case of such a proof would be where ' is of the form ^ 0 , and where the inductive h ypothesis J.W. Gray, III and P.F. Syverson. Epistemology of Information Flow in the Multilevel Security of Probabilistic Systems. NRL Memo Report 5540 95-7733, May 12, 1995 allows us to assume that both K L ! R L and K L 0 ! R L 0 are derivable from ,. Such a proof requires the prover to consider one case for each w a y that a formula ' can be constructed, and as noted above, many of these cases may h a v e nothing to do with the security of the system under consideration.
As discussed in x6.1, the crucial di erence between the K and R operators is that there is no axiom for R that corresponds to axiom KO. In particular, it is always the case that Intuitively, S V C s a ys that at all times, assuming that the low e n vironment i s a w eak adversary, he still knows the probability distribution on his next output.
In the next section, we will show that this statement is equivalent to a statement about conditional statistical independence. Namely, conditioned on the previous L-history, the next output on L is statistically independent of the previous non-L i.e., high history.
Relationship to Previous Formulations
In this section we show that , j = S V C if and only if the system speci ed by , satis es AFM i.e., the relationship between SVC and AFM is analogous to the relationship between SSC and PNI.
De nition 7.2 Let be a system with computation trees T and let L C be a subject.
We will say that satis es the Applied Flow Model AFM with respect to L i for any tree, This de nition is, except for minor notational di erences, exactly the de nition of AFM as given in Gra92 . Now w e can prove the following theorem. Theorem 7.3 Let , be a set of formulae describing and let L C be a subject. Then, satis es AFM with respect to L i , satis es the semantic interpretation of SVC with respect to L.
Proof: Let T be the set of computation trees for . Suppose that , satis es the semantic interpretation of SVC with respect to L. That is, for any point P 1 in any tree in T , Applying the semantic assignment function again, we h a v e, AP 2 S C;P 2 L 0 = b = r 8P 3 ; weak L P 2 ; P 3 A P 3 S L;P 3 L 0 = b = r where AP 3 is the adversary corresponding to the tree containing P 3 , which is equivalent to 8P 2 ; P 3 h weak L P 2 ; P 3 A P 2 S C;P 2 L 0 = b = AP 3 S L;P 3 L 0 = b i 15 J.W. Gray, III and P.F. Syverson. Epistemology of Information Flow in the Multilevel Security of Probabilistic Systems. NRL Memo Report 5540 95-7733, May 12, 1995 Thus, Formula 15 is equivalent to the statement that , satis es the semantic interpretation of SVC with respect to L. B y c hoosing P 2 = P 3 = P and by the re exivity o f weak L , F ormula 15 implies that satis es AFM with respect to L. We will now show that if satis es AFM with respect to L, then Formula 15 holds. Suppose, for reductio, that weak L P 2 ; P 3 , but AP 2 S C;P 2 L 0 = b 6 = AP 3 S L;P 3 L 0 = b. Since T AP 2 ; T A P 3 2 T , we m a y apply AFM wrt L to conclude that AP 2 S L;P 2 L 0 = b 6 = AP 3 S L;P 3 L 0 = b
Recall from Gra92 that any system satisfying AFM satis es PNI wrt the same subject. We will now show that the above equation is inconsistent with PNI, hence with AFM.
Suppose that T AP 2 and T AP 3 agree on low behavior. Then PNI is contradicted since S L;P L 0 = b is the treeP -projection of an L-event for any point P . So, suppose that T AP 2 and T AP 3 disagree on low behavior. By the secure environment assumption, AP 2 and AP 3 can be given by AP 2 a j ; ; k = H 2 aC , L j ; ; k L 2 aL j L; L; k AP 3 a j ; ; k = H 3 aC , L j ; ; k L 3 aL j L; L; k We can de ne a new adversary A 4 , which satis es the Secure Environment Assumption, by A 4 a j ; ; k = H 3 aC , L j ; ; k L 2 aL j L; L; k Thus, we also have T A 4 2 T . We n o w show b y induction on pre xes of the C-history of P 3 that T A 4 contains a point P 4 with the same history on all channels as P 3 , i.e., such that weak C P 3 ; P 4 . Obviously T A 4 contains the empty trace. Suppose that the time of P 3 is k and that there is a point i n T A 4 with the same C-history as P 3 through time k 0 k . B y construction of the computation trees, and since weak L P 2 ; P 3 , the input and output vectors that extend the subhistory of P 3 to k 0 + 1 are assigned a positive branch probability i n T A 4 . Therefore, by the structure of trees, there is a point P 4 2 T A 4 with the same C-history as P 3 through time k 0 + 1 .
Thus, by construction, AP 2 and AP 4 agree on L behavior, but AP 4 S L;P 4 L 0 = b = AP 3 S L;P 3 L 0 = b 6 = AP 2 S L;P 2 L 0 = b However, this contradicts PNI, hence AFM, and our supposition is discharged.
2
Since, as remarked, AFM is stronger than PNI Gra92 , the foregoing theorem shows that SVC is a su cient condition for a system to satisfy PNI.
Examples, continued
We note here that the security of the encryption box of Example 3.1 with respect to a subject L C is formally derivable. In fact, once the assumptions are written down, there is virtually nothing to prove. Recall the system speci cation: If C = fh; lg, I = f0; 1g, and O = f0; 1g, then, the system is speci ed by the following formula.
2 Pr C l 0 out = 0 = Pr C l 0 out = 1 = 0 : 5 In the initial speci cation relativisation to C was left implicit for simplicity since it is tantamount to relativising to the system, . Recall also that subjects are assumed to always know that the system description holds at all times. Thus, But, this is obviously derivable from ,. We also observe that for the insecure encryption box of Example 3.2 , = SSC where , encompasses those formulae that embody the system description and our assumptions about knowledge thereof. It is obvious that the insecure encryption box fails to satisfy PNI. By the attack described in the original example, we can easily nd two adversaries that satisfy the Secure Environment Assumption and agree on low behavior and yet disagree on the probability of certain low e v ents. Indeed, the low e n vironment can assign 0=1 probabilities
